By introducing external consumption habits and Limited Asset Market Participation in an otherwise standard New Keynesian DSGE model we uncover a causality link between limited asset market participation, consumption inequality and macroeconomic volatility. We also obtain that monetary contractions have redistributive e¤ects in favour of asset holders, broadly con…rming the …ndings in Coibion et al. (2012) . Finally we analyze the impact of redistributive …scal policies that target consumption inequality between households groups. Such policies have bene…cial implications for macroeconomic stability, bringing the dynamic performance of the model close to the one generated by representative-agent DSGE models.
Introduction
The years following the global 2007 …nancial crisis have witnessed growing concern for incomes inequality and for the distributional e¤ects of macroeconomic policies. Historically, redistributive actions have been the domain of …scal policies, but in recent years even monetary policies have come under scrutiny for their e¤ects on inequality. For instance Coibion et al. (2012) document that in the US monetary policy contractions have substantial and persistent redistributive e¤ects, increasing income and consumption inequality. In this paper we investigate the link between inequality, macroeconomic volatility and monetary policy in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model.
Theoretical and empirical dynamic DSGE models used for monetary policy analysis, such as Smets and Wouters (2007) , are ill-suited to address this issue, due to pervasiveness of the representative agent hypothesis. Recent developments do introduce a distinction between entrepreneurs and the rest of the households in the economy (Christiano et al. 2010 ; Brave, Campbell, Fisher, and Justiniano, 2012; Del Negro Giannoni and Schorfheide, 2013), but the characterization of entrepreneurs'function in the model is tailored to generate a …nancial accelerator and cannot generate redistributive e¤ects for monetary policy shocks.
Following Mankiw (2000) , we base our analysis on the Limited Asset Market Participation hypothesis (LAMP henceforth), drawing a distinction between agents who have full access to …nancial markets (Ricardian agents henceforth) and agents who do not participate in …nancial markets (RT consumers henceforth). Indirect support for the LAMP hypothesis is found in recent studies that document households responses to temporary tax-reductions and public transfers increases Rossi (2013) use US microdata to estimate individual-level impulse responses as well as multipliers for government spending and tax policy shocks. They …nd that wealthiest individuals tend to behave according to the predictions of standard DSGE models, whereas the poorest individuals tend to behave like RT consumers. Indeed the …scal stimuli implemented in response to the 2007-08 …nancial crisis (Oh and Reis, 2011) were largely based on increased public transfers, apparently meant to support consumption of liquidity-constrained households.
Bringing LAMP into an otherwise standard DSGE model allows to obtain a steady state characterize by inequality in wealth holdings. This seems broadly consistent with empirical evidence on wealth distribution in the US and in a number of developed economies, where half of all households hold more than 90% of net wealth (Cowell, Karagiannaki, and McKnight, 2012) .
The Lamp hypothesis has characterized a rapidly expanding literature which investigates the dynamic stability of DSGE models where RT consumers cannot smooth consumption over the business cycle. Galì et al. (2004) and Bilbiie (2008, Bilbiie henceforth) showed that satisfying the Taylor principle may not ensure model determinacy in a very simple model where price stickiness and LAMP are the only frictions. This result obtains because imperfect price adjustment to wage increases causes pro…t losses which are entirely borne by Ricardian agents. As a consequence, a real interest rate increase may be associated to a surge in aggregate demand and production even if it induces a fall in the consumption of Ricardian agents. In contrast with Bilbiie, Ascari et al. (2011) show that a modest amount of nominal wage rigidity is su¢ cient to limit pro…t volatility and to restore the standard Taylor Principle even for a very large share of RT consumers. Other contributions show that internal consumption habits (Motta and Tirelli, 2012) and steady state income and consumption inequality between the two consumer groups (Natvik, 2012) ) restore the Bilbiie result for empirically plausible calibrations of a business cycle model characterized by price and nominal wage rigidities.
Our model di¤ers from previous contributions to the LAMP literature in three key aspects. First, we assume external consumption habits, in the catching-up-with-the-Joneses tradition popularized by Abel (1990) and widely used thereafter (Smets and Wouters, 2007; Christo¤el, Coenen and Warne, 2008) . This allows to model the reaction of wage setting decisions to RT households'concern for relative consumption levels, a key driver for our results. Note that recent works do account for external habits and LAMP, but the wage sensitivity to RT concern for relative consumption is removed through some ad hoc assumptions (Coenen and Straub, 2005) , Forni, Monteforte Sessa, 2009; Coenen, Straub and Trabandt, 2012; Furlanetto and Seneca, 2012). Second, we extend the basic labor-only production function to include capital accumulation. This, in turn, allows to investigate the e¤ects of wealth holdings inequality on dynamic stability and on the dynamic adjustment to monetary policy shocks. Third, we analyze the impact of redistributive …scal policies that target consumption inequality between the two households groups.
In a nutshell, our key results are summarized as follows. External habits and consumption inequality have mutually reinforcing adverse e¤ects on determinacy. This implies that model features which raise consumption inequality, i.e. net returns on physical capital and monopoly pro…ts in the goods market equilibrium, lower the threshold share of RT consumers which triggers indeterminacy. Fiscal transfer policies that reduce steady state consumption inequality have a strongly bene…cial e¤ect on dynamic stability, drastically increasing the threshold share of RT consumers that triggers indeterminacy. In contrast with previous results obtained in LAMP models based on the internal habits hypothesis (Motta and Tirelli 2012), no bene…cial e¤ect can be obtained from purely countercyclical …scal transfers that cannot a¤ect long run income distribution. To the best of our knowledge this is the …rst contribution that identi…es a link between long-run inequality and macroeconomic instability in a New-Keynesian DSGE model.
Turning to the analysis of monetary policy shocks we are able to document that unexpected monetary contractions do have a persistent negative e¤ect on income distribution and consumption inequality: monetary contractions are in fact associated to a fall in labor incomes. Activation of steady state …scal transfer policies substantially dampens the redistributive e¤ects of monetary policies and brings the dynamic performance close to the predictions of DSGE models based on the representative agent hypothesis. Both common wisdom and recent empirical work (Immervoll and Richardson, 2011) suggest that governments implement a substantial amount of income redistribution through their tax/bene…ts systems. We provide an additional theoretical argument supporting such policies.
Our concern for the redistributive e¤ects of shocks and monetary policies in the context of DSGE models is shared by Monacelli et al. (2011) who distinguish between bond holders and entrepreneurs who also are stock holders. The latter are relatively impatient and obtain loans from bond holders subject to a borrowing constraint determined by their capital holdings. We emphasize two key di¤erences between our results and theirs. First, in their framework a contractionary interest rate shock leaves stock holders worse o¤ relative to workers, who are also the bond holders. Second, in spite of …nancial frictions, a substantial amount of risk sharing occurs between the two groups, and the e¤ect of shocks on the economy is dampened relative to our model. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe in detail the model structure, then in section 3 we present the results concerning the model stability. Section 4 presents the model's dynamic response to a monetary shock. Section 5 concludes. 3 
The Model
In this section we lay out the structure of the model without capital in the …rms production function. Ricardian households participate in …nancial markets, base their choices on intertemporal optimization and react to real interest rate changes. By contrast, RT consumers do not hold any wealth. For expositional purposes we consider …rst a model where production requires no capital, so that income inequality is only due to …rms monopoly pro…ts.
Households preferences
Households are indexed by i, where i 2 [0; 1]. RT (rt ) and Ricardian (o) consumers are de…ned over the intervals [0; ] and ( ; 1] respectively. The common preferences are characterized by the following utility function:
where 
Firms
Goods markets are monopolistically competitive, and good z is produced with the following technology:
where h t (z) is the composite labor input used by each …rm z. Firms z demand for labor type j is
where
de…nes the wage index.
The real marginal costs is:
Pt is the real wage rate and is a …scal subsidy which is …nanced by levying a lump-sum tax, T LS , on …rms. 
Sticky Prices
Price stickiness is based on the Calvo mechanism. In each period a fraction (1 p ) of …rms reoptimize and set the price e P t that maximizes the discounted sum of expected future pro…ts:
s t+s e P t P t+s mc t+s y t+s (z) subject to:
where y d t is aggregate demand and t is the stochastic discount factor. The …rst order condition (FOC) for this problem is
Ricardian Households
Ricardian households maximize (1) subject to the following period budget constraint.
Where B de…nes nominally riskless bond, R is the nominal interest rate and d de…nes real dividends.
The Euler equation is
de…nes consumption marginal utility.
Rule-of-Thumb Households
RT consumers are not able to either save or borrow and always consume their current income:
1 These …rms face symmetrical marginal costs. 5 
Labor market
For each labor input there is a union j which monopolistically sets the nominal wage, W j t , subject to (3). Each household i supplies all labour types at the given wage rates 2 and the total number of hours allocated to the di¤erent labor markets must satisfy the time-resource constraint
Ricardian and non-Ricardian households work for the same amount of time because we assume that the two groups are uniformly distributed across unions, and demand for each labour type is uniformly distributed across households, as in Galì et al. (2007) . Individual labor income therefore is
Finally, we assume that the representative union objective function is a weighted average (1 , ) of the utility functions of the two households types (see Colciago, 2011; Motta and Tirelli, 2012) . This, in turn, implies that with ‡exible wages
is the RT marginal utility of consumption and w = w ( w 1) represents the wage markup.
Aggregation
Aggregation yields:
Monetary Policy
Monetary policy follows a standard Taylor rule
The model in log-linear form
We take a log-linear approximation around the zero-in ‡ation deterministic steady state 3 . Right from the outset note that dynamics are a¤ected by the steady-state relative consumption shares of the two groups 
Supply sideŷ
t =ĥ t (20)
Monetary policy ruleR
t = ^ t :(29)
Stability analysis
In this section we investigate the e¤ects that habits and consumption inequality have on determinacy. To identify the role of habits we posit that the production subsidy = brings production at the competitive level. Under the additional assumption that the subsidy is entirely …nanced by lump-sum taxes levied on …rms, as in Ascari et al. ( 2011) , this implies that in steady state …rms pro…ts are nil, and that consumption is identical for the two consumer groups. From (20) , (21), (22) we getŵ
Note that due to price stickiness, …rms pro…ts are the inverse of marginal cost deviations from steady state.
Using (20), (28), (30) , and (31) it is easy to see that in equilibrium each optimizing household must consume
. When = 0 (and = 1), an increase in current output is associated with a real wage increase and with a pro…ts reduction that exactly o¤set each other. By contrast, when > 0 the increase in output entails a redistribution of income from asset holders to RT consumers captured by term
in . For "large" values of , pro…t losses exceed the positive labor income variation determined by the increase in output. In this case < 0 andĉ o t is inversely related tô y t . This point was initially raised by Billbie (2008) , who demonstrated that the negative value of is associated to indeterminacy. Here we show that unambiguously falls in b. From (21) and (22) , it is easy to see that this happens because habits raise the sensitivity of^ j t toĉ j t , inducing a stronger reaction of wages to output.
By substituting (32) into (27) we get the New Keynesian IS curvê
< 0 causes the inversion of the IS curve. It is quite apparent that the habits coe¢ cient has negative e¤ect on
Proposition 1 Under a Taylor rule that controls contemporaneous in ‡ation the model is stable and uniquely determined if does not exceed a threshold such that
, 4 Due to the e¢ cient steady state assumption, pro…ts are de…ned here as a fraction of steady state output. t is de…ned as a fraction of steady state output.
that is
Proof. See Appendix A Further insights on determinacy require that we impose restrictions on parameters. The parameter governing the degree of habit persistence, b, and the labor utility parameter, l are respectively set at 0:65 and 3, well in the ranges of the estimates obtained by Smets and Wouters (2005) . We set = (1:03) 0:25 which implies a steady-state annualized real interest rate of about 3%. Values for price stickiness are taken from Christiano et al. (2005) , p = 0:6, who …nd that prices are optimized every 2:5 quarters. This, in turn, implies that = 0:2696
Under our benchmark calibration we obtain that the inversion of (33) occurs at > ' 0:18, whereas ' 0:21. 6 Larger consumption habits unambiguously lower the threshold value . In fact we obtain @ @b < 0 for 0:2 < l < 100, 0 b < 1, 1 < < 100. The inverse of the Frish elasticity, l , typically lies in the range 0:2-5 In Figure 1 we show that the corresponding value for monotonically falls from 0:25 to 0:1
The role of consumption inequality
If we relax the zero steady-state pro…ts assumption, i.e. = 0, we get 
6 Just like Bilbiie we …nd that in principle a strong antin ‡ation response can ensure determinacy under a Taylor rule for any value of , but this would require implausibly large values for . For instance, in our case = 0:54 if we set = 40 and = 0:72 if we set = 100. 7 Given (14) and (19), steady state RT households marginal utility from consumption is positive only if 1 b > 0. Our calibration for b ensures that this condition holds. 8 To preserve comparison with (32) we de…ne pro…ts as a fraction of steady state output.
9 where
. 9 We
Assuming a price markup = 1:2, we obtain < 0 if 0:042 < < 0:46, yet our calculations show that determinacy obtains only if does not exceed the threshold value ' 0:13. To understand this result consider that > 0 when > 0:46 because in this case the following condition holds
where term
@ŵt . Note that (37) is also crucial to identify the sensitivity ofŵ t tô y t .ŵ 
In fact when (37) holds, the e¤ect of a wage change on the consumption marginal utility of RT households is so powerful that a positive wage reaction to an increase in labor demand cannot satisfy equation (21), and the sign of the wage reaction to the output gap is reversed. In this case an increase in output is associated to a fall in the real wage, to an increase in the consumption of optimizing households and to a fall inĉ rt t , as documented in (36) . Finally, our calculations show that steady-state consumption inequality, measured by 
Model extensions 3.2.1 Sticky wages
Previous contributions (Colciago, 2011; Ascari et al., 2011) suggest that under wage stickiness the potential indeterminacy caused by RT households is de facto unlikely. 11 Following Colciago (2011), we model wage stickiness by assuming that in each period a fraction w of unions cannot reoptimize and hold their wage constant, whereas the remaining (1 w ) unions set f W t to maximise a weighted average of the two household types utility functions, conditional to the probability that the wage cannot be reoptimized in the future.
The relevant constraints are (7), (10), and (11). Equation (13) is now replaced by 
In loglinear form (41) is 2 6 6 4 (42) Relative to (38) , it is easy to see that nominal stickiness ( w > 0) dampens wage sensitivity to business cycle conditions and limits income redistribution between the two households groups when shocks hit the economy. As a result, the determinacy threshold is ' 0:79 if we set w = 0:64. 
Capital accumulation
We now extend our model to include those elements which are common in medium scale DSGE models (e.g. Christiano et al, 2005; Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2005) such as capital accumulation,variable capacity utilization and investment adjustment costs. Capital accumulation increases income and consumption inequality because under LAMP only Ricardian agents hold physical capital k: Equations (2), (4), and (15) respectively become: 
11
where r k t is the net real rental rate of capital, i t de…nes real investment. 13 Physical capital accumulation is driven by
and # and S respectively denote the physical rate of depreciation and investment adjustment costs.
The following …rst order conditions describe demand functions for capital and investment and the optimal degree of capital utilization. 
The …rst order condition for investment is
Following Christiano et al (2005) the investment adjustment cost function and the capital utilization function
15 are:
where P k 0 ;t is the shadow relative price of one unit of capital with respect to one unit of consumption. Capital holdings in the hands of Ricardian consumers unambiguously increase consumption inequality in steady state:
Given the previous discussion about the complementarity between external habits and income inequality, we expect that the determinacy threshold should fall relative to the value ' 0:79 we obtained in section 3.2.1. We set = 0:36, # = 0:025;as in Christiano et al. (2005) . This, in turn 1 3 In the following we assume that = 0. See the appendix for a description of the full model 1 4 P k 0 ;t is the shadow relative price of one unit of capital with respect to one unit of consumption. 1 5 Note that S (1) = S 0 (1) = 0 and S 00 (1) > 0, implying the absence of adjustment costs up to a …rst order approximation of the deterministic steady state.The function a ( ), instead, is assumed to satisfy a (1) = 0 and a 0 (1) ; a 00 (1) > 0. Moreover the parameters 1 and 2 are …xed given that a 0 (u) = r k at steady state. 16 Under this calibration we obtain ' 0:29. Thus consumption inequality in steady state has a very strong e¤ect on the determinacy threshold. This happens because the larger consumption inequality, the more sensitive the nominal wage to the output gap, and the less e¤ective is nominal wage stickiness in preserving determinacy.
Sensitivity analysis
Our analysis suggests that in a medium scale model determinacy should depend on a limited number of parameters. Among these, the capital income share and the price markup in ‡uence steady state consumption inequality 17 , whereas the habit coe¢ cient b, the inverse of the Frisch elasticity l , the parameters governing price and nominal wage stickiness, p and w , a¤ect income redistribution outside steady state. 
Fiscal redistribution
Governments do reduce the dispersion of individual income and consumption levels by means of factor incomes taxation and redistributive transfers. 19 To assess the potential e¤ects of such policies in our framework we now introduce a constant …scal transfer to RT consumers, …nanced by a lump-sum tax paid by Ricardian agents, as in Galì et al. (2007) . By assumption, the transfer is proportional to the steady state consumption gap between the two households types.
From our discussion reducing consumption inequality between the two groups is crucial to limit wage sensitivity to the output gap, the key factor that causes indeterminacy in our model. In Table 2 we show that for = 0:3 the ratio 
The redistributive e¤ects of a monetary shock
In this section 20 we investigate the e¤ects of an interest rate shock on aggregate volatility and on income and consumption inequality. In Table 3 we report standard deviations for key macroeco- 1 6 Note that term is independent from the fraction of RT consumers. 1 7 See equation. (51) 1 8 b = 0:68 is the maximum value we can set for the habit persistence in order to avoid a negative steady state marginal utility of consumption for RT consumers. 1 9 See for instance Heathcote et al. (2010) for a discussion of the US case. 2 0 In Appendix E we present the full model in log-linear form and provide details of shocks calibration.
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nomic variables under full asset market participation (column 1) and under LAMP ( = 0:25) for a di¤erent strength of the …scal redistributive policy. In columns 2 and 3 we posit that = 0:25 21 whereas parameter T in (52) takes values 0 and 0:15 which implies a 20% reduction in the post tax Gini index in steady state. 22 Then in column 4 we also consider the possibility that the …scal transfer also reacts to cyclical consumption inequalitŷ It is easy to see that without …scal policies LAMP causes a substantial increase in volatility, whereas redistributive …scal policies have a powerful dampening e¤ect on volatility. Indeed volatility …gures obtained in the model characterized by LAMP-cum-…scal-redistribution are very close to those obtained in the standard representative agent model. In addition, the bulk of the stabilization is obtained implementing steady state redistributive policies, whereas the cyclical rule (53) plays a lesser role. 23 To support intuition, we plot IRFs to an interest rate shock. In Figure 2 we consider aggregate variables. Under full asset market participation in ‡ation output, consumption, worked hours and the real wage fall. Introducing LAMP without …scal policies causes an inversion in the relationship between the real interest rate and output, that now increases in response to the contraction. The real wage fall redistributes income in favor of Ricardian agents whose consumption grows, driving the surge in total consumption. The increase in hours raises the productivity of capital, inducing Ricardian households to raise investment as well. It is interesting to note that under full asset market participation Ricardian households would do just the opposite, decumulating capital to smooth consumption. Fiscal policies bring IRFs for aggregate variables under LAMP much closer to what we observe under full asset market participation. Nevertheless, the monetary policy shock still has redistributive e¤ects between the two household groups. In fact, in spite of the …scal policy actions the interest rate shock raises gapes in relative income and consumption levels (ŷ 
Conclusion
We embodied limited asset market participation in a popular medium scale New Keynesian DSGE model. We showed that external habits and consumption inequality have mutually reinforcing adverse e¤ects on determinacy, uncovering a causality link between limited asset market participation, consumption inequality and macroeconomic volatility. Our framework also allows to investigate the redistributive e¤ects of monetary policies which are associated to inequality of wealth holdings when risk sharing is precluded.
We have also shown that redistributive policies targeting consumption inequality have bene…-cial implications for macroeconomic stability, bringing the dynamic performance of the model close to the one generated by representative agent DSGE models. This suggests an intriguing conjecture: these latter models might apparently succeed in matching business cycle facts when in the real economy the underlying …scal policy regime compensates for the e¤ects of LAMP, but their performance might not be robust to …scal reforms that limit discretionary policies and/or reduce the e¤ectiveness of automatic …scal stabilizers. Further, tighter regulation of …nancial markets in the aftermath of the 2007 …nancial crisis should be complemented with more interventionist …scal policies. We leave this for future research.
[13] Colciago, A., Ropele, T., Muscatelli, V.A. where
The system is characterized by two jump variables (^ t andŷ t ) and one state variable (ŷ t 1 ).
The Characteristic polynomial is
The stability properties of the system depend on the location of the roots inside the unit circle in the complex plane, i.e. jX i j < 1. By adopting the conformal involuntary transformation
it is in general possible to turn P T (X) into a Hurwitz polynomial 24 P H (x), whose stability properties depend on the location of the roots in the left hand plane R(X) < 0: where x i , i = 1; 3 are the roots of P H (x).
The necessary condition for model's stability is:
l + which is always true when condition (54) is satis…ed, condition (54) is the necessary and su¢ cient condition for determinacy under the Taylor principle.
B Derivation of (35)
The Ricardian consumption can be written aŝ 
)
Remembering thatĉ rt t =ŵ t +ĥ t we obtain (38) We can rewrite the wage setting condition 
The equation for the optimal wage allows us to derive the solution for worked hours
